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Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The
Quest for the Archimedean Point
MARK G. YJDOF*
[T]he perplexing and difficult demands of the Archimedean point [are]
to find a standpoint neither compromised by its implication in the world
nor dissociated and so disqualified by detachment. "We need a concep-
tion that enables us to envision our objective from afar" . . . but not
too far; the desired standpoint is "not a perspective from a certain place
beyond the world, nor the point of view of a transcendent being; rather
it is a certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt
within the world."**
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional theories of liberty and autonomy do not fit well when the sub-
jects are children and education. For adults, democratic governments generally
seek to abide by the Kantian maxim that each person should be treated as
a kingdom of ends-treated with respect for his or her autonomy, rationality,
and human worth-and not as a means or an instrument of another person's
will.' Children, however, are rightfully perceived as both ends in themselves,
evolving autonomous beings, and as instruments of larger societal purposes.
Those purposes include the assimilation of the child into the larger culture,
for the intergenerational, exogenetic transmission of values, knowledge,
language, and customs is essential to the preservation of community and to
* Dean and James A. Elkins Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin, School
of Law. I wish to thank my able research assistant, Dia Wolkow Epstein, for her assistance
in preparing this article.
** M.J. SANDEL, LIBERAISM AND THE LnrnTs OF JusncE 17 (1982) (quoting J. RAwis, A
THEORY oF JUSnCE 22, 587 (1971)).
1. M.J. SANDEL, LmERALISM AND THE LImrrs oF JusTIcE 14 (1982); J. RAwts, A THEORY
OF Jusrca 264 (1971).
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the definition of persons within community. Paradoxically, education both
promotes autonomy and, in a sense, denies it by shaping and constraining
present and future life choices.'
The education of children, in any form, whether compulsory or not,
inevitably raises conflict. Children are not born with an appreciation of
literature and democratic institutions, and they, including the most precocious
among them, certainly are unlikely to discover geometry, computers, or quan-
tum mechanics without the benefit of the accumulated wisdom of the past.
Professor Tawney once described children as a "new race of souls" that bursts
upon us every year, who stand "on the threshold with the world at their feet,
like barbarians grazing upon the time-worn plains of an ancient civilization." 3
But, if one substitutes pejorative words like propaganda, indoctrination, and
brainwashing for an acceptable word like education, one gets a sense of the
conflict. Children need to be socialized to societal norms, but they also need
to grow up to be relatively autonomous beings within the confines of culture.
Basic knowledge and values should be communicated to them while attempt-
ing, as best one can, to give the young "ample opportunity of making the
decisions upon which these principles are based, and by which they are
modified, improved, adapted to changed circumstances, or even abandoned
if they become entirely unsuited to the new environment." 4
The conflict between acculturation and autonomy inevitably leads to con-
sideration of the concept of justifiable paternalism. Education is a form of
affirmative liberty. Children are socialized though subjection to coercive and
persuasive measures that enable them to become autonomous as adults-that
is, they are socialized for their own good. Education can expand the mind
or it can contract it, and mind-expanding education facilitates adult autonomy.
Upon reaching adulthood, the subjects of the earlier paternalism would express
gratitude, not indignation, for their treatment. But, however justifiable the
paternalism for those who have not fully matured into personhood, there re-
mains the problem of balance. If the education is too narrow and all-
encompassing, then autonomous citizens will not be produced. Words like
domination and constraints on choice creep into the analysis. If autonomy
is stressed at the price of education, then there is a justifiable fear of loss
of community, alienation, and ignorance.
The pursuit of the ideal education, like the pursuit of justice, requires
objectivity, reflection, detachment, and also immersion in actual experience
and in the contingent world inhabited by social beings. Both educators and
2. See generally Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 876-77 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
3. R.H. TAwNEY, THE RADICAL TRADnoN 81 (1964).
4. R.M. HARE, DECISIONS OF PRINCIPLE, PMLosoPsHY AND EDUCATION 72, 85 (I. Scheffler
ed. 1958). See also A.N. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD (1962); SELECTED
WRrNGs OF EDMUND BURKE 354 (W.J. Bate ed. 1960).
[Voi.59:527
LIBRAR Y BOOK SELECTION
philosophers "need an 'Archimedean point' from which to assess the basic
structure of society:" '
The problem is to give an account of where such a point could conceivably
be found. Two possibilities seem to present themselves, each equally
unsatisfactory: if the principles of justice are derived from the values or
conceptions of the good current in the society, there is no assurance that
the critical standpoint they provide is any more valid than the conceptions
they would regulate since, as a product of those values, justice would be
subject to the same contingencies. The alternate would seem a standard
somehow external to the values and interests prevailing in society. But
if our experience were disqualified entirely as the source of such principles,
the alternative would seem to be reliance on a priori assumptions ...
[which] would be arbitrary because groundless. 6
Philosophers have long debated the position of the Archimedean point. For
David Hume, for example, justice derives only from human conventions and
society;7 for Kant, however, justice must be premised on transcendental moral
deductions that reject appeals to "contingent human circumstances." 8 John
Rawls' modern theory of justice9 may be perceived as seeking to combine
Humean empiricism with Kantian metaphysics; his "original position," in
which persons choose principles of justice, requires them to be ignorant of
contingent natural and social circumstances and to be knowledgeable about
their common interests and desires.'I Michael Walzer's more recent effort to
define "spheres of justice"" implicitly embraces the Humean empirical
perspective.
The ideal education necessarily requires the location of an Archimedean
point, a point positioned somewhere between critical reflection and ground-
ing in the contingent circumstances of society. To demonstrate this fact and
the link between education and justice, one need look no further than Rawls'
artificial construct, the original position. If persons in the original position
were first children, there would be no reason to suppose that they would be
aware of their common interests, rights, and liberties. Nor could one assume
ignorance of their individual social, economic, and political conditions. If,
as adults, they can only choose rational principles of justice with a certain
combination of knowledge and ignorance, then there must be an antecedent
educational experience that prepares them for those choices. But that educa-
tional experience must be philosophically rooted in some conception of an
Archimedean point. The discovery of commonalities presumably would require
5. M.J. SANDum, supra note 1, at 16-17.
6. Id. at 17.
7. Id. at 36 (citing D. Huza, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING m PIuNcIPLEs OF MoRAis 20 (1966)).
8. Id. (citing I. KANT, GRouNDOwlu OF Tim MTAPseSIcs OF MoRAmS 109 (H.J. Paton trans.
1956)).
9. J. RAWiS, supra note 1.
10. M.J. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 24-27.
11. M. WALzER, SrnaIUs oF JusncE (1983). See also M. OAIESHOTT, RATIONAISM IN PoLsmcs
(1962).
19841
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
both detached reflection and empirical inquiry; the "veil of ignorance" of
contingent personal circumstances would require rejection of much knowledge
about society and the status of individuals within it.
How, then, is society to account for and to achieve the Archimedean point
in education? Realistically viewed, there may be no optimal, theoretical balance
between basic education and an all-pervasive indoctrination. Instead, there
may only be an evolutionary process, worked at day by day, and guided by
common sense, moderation, and an appreciation of conflicting values. An
analogy can be drawn to sailing. Apart from the general forward movement,
the boat itself is never still in the water. It is constantly moving up and down
on the waves, from side to side with the wind and current. The sailor constantly
adjusts the tiller and sheets to maintain the boat's balance. The same kind
of constant adjustment may be required of school officials and society to
achieve the best balance of assimilation and autonomy. Children must be in-
tegrated into the community but they should not be stifled. The desire to
create informed citizens who understand the world in which they were born
and live must be tempered by the realization that much of what society achieves
depends on individuals who do not or will not conform to the prevailing
wisdom. As John Updike recently expressed the point, "[o]ur artistic heroes
tend to be those self-exercisers, like Picasso, and Nabokov, and Wallace
Stevens, who rather defiantly kept playing past dark."' 2 Children must learn
the rules of the game, but that learning must stop short of an orthodoxy
that playing after dark is always forbidden.
Controversies over school library book policies are a modern manifestation
of society's collective discomfort with these issues. The critical questions are
who will control socialization of the young, what are the values to which they
will be socialized, and how will cultural grounding and critical reflection be
accommodated. The Supreme Court wrestled with these problems in Board
of Education v. Pico,'3 but the Court was not quite up to the historic occa-
sion. Five Justices agreed to remand the case for trial, concluding that a
summary judgment for the defendant school district was improper. But the
Justices, like the Delphic oracle, spoke in contradictory terms. To find con-
sensus, one must learn to be something of a Kremlinologist of the judiciary,
relying on the unspoken and tacit, taking advantage of every hint and aside.
But before embarking on this task, one needs to have a better understanding
of the Archimedean difficulty in education and of the present structure of
decisionmaking in public schools.
II. AUTONOMY AND COMMUNITY
The problem of children and education runs deeper than a reification of
12. Updike, A Few Words in Defense of the Amateur Reader, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1984,
§ 7 (Book Review), at 13.
13. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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the conflict between socialization and autonomy. The question cannot be
whether children ought to be socialized, that is, whether their autonomy should
be simultaneously constrained and nourished. To paraphrase Professor C.
Edwin Baker, to the extent that adults create a reality for children, an
acceptable theory must concern itself with questions of who socializes children
and how.' 4 A world will be created for children, for they are not born with
a particular cultural orientation. The relevant questions is who will write on
the slates, not whether they will be written on at all. If there was no formal
education in public institutions, values and beliefs would continue to be instilled
by family, church, peers, and life experiences.
But the antinomy between socialization and autonomy may not only distort
analysis by ignoring the inevitability of acculturation, it may also give a false
impression of autonomy and the concept of self that underlies it. The assump-
tion is that a person can abstract himself or herself from the cultural milieu-
that the layers of cultural artifacts may be unpeeled, revealing a human essence
untainted by communitarian constraints. But the metaphor of the peeled onion
may strike wide of the mark. To anthropologist Clifford Geertz, there is no
such thing as a human nature independent of culture. 5 Culture is the link
between what we are and what we are capable of becoming,' 6 and our
"plasticity," our "capacity for learning," as much demonstrates our
dependence on cultural definition as our ability to adapt and to change over
time.' 7 "Becoming human is becoming individual, and we become individual
under the guidance of cultural patterns, historically created systems of mean-
ing in terms of which we give form, order, point, and direction to our lives."'"
A person's self-conception is inherently interreactional, dependent on defin-
ing a self and others." As Janet Radcliffe Richards articulated this point in
relation to gender identity,
You cannot distinguish between the woman as she now is and what is
supposed to be the "true" woman by pointing to the way society has
shaped her. It is absolutely inevitable that the adult woman should be
as she is partly as a result of social influence, and it is a thing that we
cannot possibly object to unless we are to suggest people should be sent
to grow up among wolves . . . . We cannot say of social pressures in
general that they turn the woman into something which is not her true
self; on the contrary, they cannot be anything other than a contribution
to what she actually is.20
14. Baker, The Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964,
1026 (1978).
15. C. GEERTZ, Tm INTERPRETATION OF CuTurr.s 49 (1973).
16. Id. at 52.
17. Id. at 49.
18. Id. at 52.
19. Davis, Critical Jurisprudence: An Essay on the Legal Theory of Robert Burt's Taking
Care of Strangers, 1981 Wisc. L. REv. 419. See also M.J. SANDa, supra note 1, at 21, 49-50, 153.
20. J.R. RIctARDs, THE SCEPTICAL FEUINIST: A PriLOSOPMCAL ENQUIRY 80 (1980). Wallace
Stevens, himself a player after dark, captured the paradoxes of the self in his poem The Idea
of Order at Key West:
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Thus, the self in the concept of autonomy is partially defined by the culture;
the antithesis between autonomy and indoctrination is an oversimplification
because the self has links to and is defined in the context of communicated
community norms. The converse is also true. The community and its indoc-
trination efforts may be shaped by many selves, for there is a mutually affect-
ing relationship between community and individual. The interdependence of
self and community does not require the "'disappearance of man' and the
linked notions of selfhood, individual action, and responsibility." 2' Nor does
it mean, as many critical legal theorists maintain, that autonomy is an illu-
sion or that cultural limits are largely contingent and avoidable." An educa-
tional system that ignored autonomy and emphasized only indoctrination to
communal norms would be thoroughly totalitarian and destructive of human
values.
In the context of public schooling and beyond, the key to unraveling the
paradoxes of education of the young lies neither in the reification of autonomy
nor in the mysticism of transcendental communities. Children are autonomous
individuals, and they are members of groups. Their selves are in part defined
The sea was not a mask. No more was she.
The song and water were not medleyed sound
Even if what she sang was what she heard,
Since what she sang was uttered word by word.
It may be that in all her phrases stirred
The grinding water and the gasping wind;
But it was she and not the sea we heard.
. And when she sang, the sea,
Whatever self it had, became the self
That was her song, for she was the maker ...
W. STEVENS, SELECTED POEMS 77-78 (1953).
21. Levinson, Book Review, 96 HAiv. L. REv. 1466, 1482 n.55 (1983) (citing M. FOUCAULT,
THE ORDER oF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF TnE HuMAN SCIENCES 386 (1970)).
22. See generally Davis, supra note 19 at 447. Ironically, critical theorists often assert that
they are demystifying philosophical and legal theory by illuminating the relationship between
self and community. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Bus-
FAro L. REV. 205, 221 (1979). In dialectical fashion, they seek to transcend individuality and
community and to deny that contradictions between individual and group would exist in their
ideal community. Professor Tushnet, for example, speaks of two worlds-the world external
to us with social boundaries, and the world constructed by us as we interact with others. Tushnet,
Deviant Science in Constitutional Law, 59 TEx. L. REv. 815, 816 (1981). He asserts that we
view ourselves as autonomous agents and as interdependent members of groups and he accuses
the philosophy of individualism for leaving each person to confront the external world in isola-
tion. He labels as utopian his solution "to construct a society in which both experiences can
be simultaneously and forcefully affirmed." Id. at 824. He is curiously short of details on the
ideal community-it is difficult to imagine educational institutions in his New Jerusalem, but
he comforts himself with a "rhetorical mode" of Marxism that sets him at some distance from
conventional legal thinkers. Id. at 826. The tie between his Marxism and his quest for utopian
community, apart from the self-avowed and successful effort to jangle the nerves of liberal theorists,
is entirely unclear. He appears left with a neo-Kantian perspective that rejects present cultural
experiences as contingent, while embracing forms of romantic community that are rooted only
in his own reflective, and many would urge arbitrary, aspirations. See generally Shiffrin, Liberalism,
Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1103 (1983).
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by social relations, but social relations are also in part defined by their
personalities. 23 The self and community cannot be completely separated, but
they also cannot be completely integrated. The "good" has both particular
and universal aspects. Not every cultural influence or imperative constitutes
domination. Cultures do and should constrain.
A nagging problem for both liberal philosophers and critical theorists is
the need to differentiate between unacceptable constraints on individuality,
leading to a loss of autonomy and creativity, and acceptable communitarian
constraints that reduce alienation and enhance the cultured definition of self.
Unless and until the epistemological millenium is approached, wisdom lies
in a pragmatic recognition of the dynamic, uncertain, and complex relation-
ship between cultural authority and individuality. That recognition entails
frequent and numerous adjustments in institutional and social arrangements,
in an atmosphere of tolerance and epistemological optimism. Contradictions
will still abound. The culture, with its educational institutions, provides the
raw materials for autonomy and community life. But, as Ruth Benedict sage-
ly remarked, "no civilization has in it any element which in the last analysis
is not the contribution of an individual. ' 24
What types of institutions and traditions are necessary to locate and hold
to this Archimedean point? The answer is more aesthetic than empirical or
scientific. In Alasdair MacIntyre's memorable phrase, institutions and social
conventions must "embody continuities of conflict. ' 25 There must be continuity
with the forms of community, and also a movement "forward from . . .
[moral] particularity" to the search for universal good.2 6 That search inherently
produces conflict, but conflict within a "socially embodied argument. ' 21 In
other words, the socialization process should involve the inculcation of "liv-
ing traditions" in which there is a narrative or story to be learned, but that
narrative should be treated as unfinished or incomplete. 28 If the society and
its institutions and traditions are to remain vital, there needs to be an ade-
quate grasp "of those future possibilities which the past has made available
to the present." 2 9
III. PUBLIC EDUCATION: WHO DEcIDEs?
Turning from the grand abstractions to life in the trenches, what is the
structure of decisionmaking on socialization issues in public schools? Who
determines what is to be taught and what books are to be acquired? Who
23. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrIcs 270 (1975).
24. R. BENEDICT, PATTERNS oF CuLTURE 253 (1959).
25. A. MAcIrNTsRE, AFTER ViRTuE 206 (1981).
26. Id. at 205.
27. Id. at 207.
28. Id.
29. Id.
1984]
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balances autonomy and acculturation? For the most part, elected represen-
tatives, school board members, school administrators, librarians, and teachers
share responsibility and are, at least in theory, accountable to the citizenry
for their performance. There is no necessary reason for arranging affairs this
way; many have proposed alternatives that would enhance, for example, either
the power of families or the power of professional librarians or teachers to
make educational choices.3" But the basic structural decisions have already
been made, and these are reflected in existing legal and institutional
arrangements.
This structure necessarily puts the state in the business of editing the
curriculum. "Of necessity, elementary and secondary educators must separate
the relevant from the irrelevant, the appropriate from the inappropriate." ' 3'
This task involves selecting books for inclusion in the school library and for
optional or required reading in designated courses. If no such authority existed,
if disgruntled parents and others had a "right" to equal time to reply to the
state's program, and if public schools were public forums in the fullest -sense
of the phrase (like public parks for example), the education mission of the
schools, including acculturation, would become impossible.3 2 As a general mat-
ter, despite some wishful thinking to the contrary, 33 schools are not subject
to the various balancing-of-the-message doctrines, including fairness, a right
to reply, and equal time.3 4 As Professor Canby has stated,
"[E]diting is what editors are for; and editing is the selection and choice
of material." ... To forbid the managers of (public communication) enter-
prises to select material for inclusion and, necessarily, exclusion would
for all practical purposes destroy these endeavors. 31
If one pauses a moment to reflect on these matters, it becomes clear why
curricular and book purchasing decisions generally should be left to the state
under current institutional arrangements. Merely because the government owns
and operates an enterprise devoted to communication does not mean that the
30. See, e.g., J. CooNs & S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CON-
TROL (1978); Sugarman &. Kirp, Rethinking Collective Responsibility for Education, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 144 (1975). See generally R. MNOOKIN, CHI.D, FAMILY AND STATE (1978).
31. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 914 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277-78 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). Cf. Muir
v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1274 (1983).
33. See, e.g., Stern, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum Material: Rights of
Students and Parents, 14 HAsv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 485 (1975); Kamenshine, The First Amend-
ment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALI. L. REv. 1104 (1979).
34. See Buckel v. Prentice, 572 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1978). But cf. Bonner-Lyons v. School
Comm., 480 F.2d 442 (lst Cir. 1973). See generally M.G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS:
POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT ExPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
35. Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for Public Broad-
casting, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1123, 1124-25 (1974). William C. Canby, Jr. presently serves as a judge
on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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government cannot, in good faith, carry out its editorial functions.36 Where
time and resources are scarce, selectivity is inherent in communication. There
is a myth in constitutional lore that government is nearly always forbidden
from making content distinctions. 37 Such a notion has some plausibility when
applied to government regulation of private activity. Where the government
is itself communicating, or making available scarce resources to enhance private
speech, the general ban on taking content into account is unsound.
Not every government communication facility is a public forum. A municipal
auditorium is not a park or street, and government policies may favor
orchestral performances over dramatic productions. So too, a publicly-owned
and operated social science library is not constitutionally forbidden if books
on chemistry and physics are routinely rejected for inclusion in the collection.
Justice Stevens illuminated this point beautifully in his concurring opinion
in Widmar v. Vincent,38 a case involving access to facilities at a public
university:
In performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a
university routinely make countless decisions based on the content of
communicative materials. They select books for inclusion in the library,
they hire professors on the basis of their academic philosophies, they select
courses for inclusion in the curriculum, and they reward scholars for what
they have written ...
... I should think it obvious, for example, that if two groups of 25
students requested the use of a room at a particular time-one to view
Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse an amateur performance
of Hamlet-the First Amendment would not require that the room be
reserved for the group that submitted its application first ...
... I do not subscribe to the view that a public university has no greater
interest in the content of student activities than the police chief has in
the content of a soapbox oration on Capitol Hill.3 9
As Justice Stevens later notes, some types of content decisions may be
forbidden even when government is the facilitator of private communications:
"the University could not allow a group of Republicans or Presbyterians to
meet while denying Democrats or Mormons the same privilege." ' 40 But a
blanket ban on content distinctions, irrespective of the mission of the govern-
mental institution, is constitutionally and practically absurd.
A person does not have a constitutional right to publish his or her article
in the law review of a state university; that would undermine the mission of
36. But see Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 148-70
(1973).
37. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
38. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
39. Id. at 278-80 (Stevens, J., concurring). Cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators
Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
40. Id. at 281 (Stevens, J., citing Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment:
A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727 (1980)).
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publishing high quality, scholarly articles.4' Neither should prison rehabilita-
tion programs, state-sponsored psychiatric programs for the mentally infirm,
or, for that matter, the President's State of the Union Address be subject
to dilution by requirements of fairness, balance, or access as a matter of
constitutional law.42 Such standards for government communications have
sometimes been voluntarily adopted by statute, regulation, or practice.4 3 But
if one concedes that public schooling, prison rehabilitation programs, military
training, and other government communication efforts are legitimate and,
indeed, essential for public well-being, then government cannot be denied the
editorial power that is a necessary precondition to the achievement of its
objectives.4
This logic is bolstered in the case of public elementary and secondary school-
ing by the fact that school children are a captive audience for the purpose
of accomplishing particular educational objectives. They are in school because
the electorate has decided, through democratic processes, that they should
be there, and that hence, the duly elected and appointed representatives of
the people should make the basic editorial decisions. The loss of liberty to
parents and children that compulsory education causes is difficult to justify
if the students are held captive to private communicators who have their own
educational or indoctrination agenda. 5 As Professor Shiffrin succinctly writes,
"To make education compulsory was itself to challenge liberal ideology. The
essence of compulsory education is that the state and not the parents will
ultimately decide what is best for children." ' 46
But there are risks. The power of government to make these selections,
to control communications, is also the power to destroy the underpinnings
of government by consent, since that consent can be manipulated out of or
into existence.
Freedom of expression and association are critical to the process of consent,
which government speech may threaten by impairing independence ofjudgment-through indoctrination, withholding of vital information, and
preventing the communication of political judgments among individuals.
The structure of American constitutional government and the underlying
historical assumptions about the relationship between the governed and
41. See Avins v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J., 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968). See generally Canby, supra note 35.
42. See M.G. YuDoF, supra note 34, at 295.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 242.
45. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring). Katz, The First Amendment's Protection
of Expressive Activity in the University Classroom: A Constitutional Myth, 16 U.C.D. L. REv.
857 (1983). See generally Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor,
53 CoLum. L. Rev. 960 (1953).
46. See Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 565, 648 (1980).
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the governors buttress the view that the first amendment encompasses limits
on government expression.4
7
If the reflective, informed citizen, participating in governance decisions, is
a philosophical root of freedom of expression, then government domination
of communications networks is potentially as destructive of that concern as
government censorship of private speech.' Governments, staffed by self-
interested politicians and bureaucrats, may aim for self-perpetuation and
uncritical acceptance of the status quo and not for the Archimedean point.'9
Because of this danger, letting the government control education may be like
letting the fox guard the henhouse. That is why the boundaries of state power
need to be probed. But the denial of the power to edit, to determine what
shall or shall not be taught and assigned, is inherently incompatible with the
public schooling enterprise.
IV. HISTORY OF TEXTBOOK PROTESTS
The established decisionmaking structure of public education has not
prevented text and library book selection policies from generating conflicts
over the limits of prohibited orthodoxy and legitimate indoctrination." Apart
from the state agencies that have the power to approve the state's textbooks,
and therefore to influence their content, private interest groups also have been
successful in commanding publishers' attention and in securing changes in
books.5'
Textbook challenges date back to the mid-1800's, but they increased in
number and intensity after World War I, about the same time that secondary
education became universal. In the latter era, miscellaneous elements of the
political right voiced their objections to slanted textbooks, as they complained
of inattentiveness to military history, pro-Jewish, Catholic, and British
sentiment, and discussions of evolution. During the Depression, protests fad-
ed while a progressive era in textbook writing proceeded. The anti-Communist
upheavals of the 1950's gave rise to more extreme protests. A member of
the Indiana State Textbook Commission believed Robin Hood was a
communist and wanted all mention of his legend purged from the state's text-
47. M.G. YUDOF, supra note 34, at 160.
48. Id. See also Yudof, In Search of a Free Speech Principle, 82 MicH. L. Rv. 680, 694,
700 (1984). But see Schauer, Book Review, 35 SrA. L. Rnv. 373 (1983).
49. Yudof, supra note 48, at 700.
50. See generally Note, Education Law: Local School Board Authority v. Students' First
Amendment Rights, 7 J. Juv. L. 40 (1983); Harpaz, A Paradigm of First Amendment Dilemmas:
Resolving Public School Library Censorship Disputes, 4 W. New ENG. L. Rev. 1 (1981); Note,
Remedy Without A Right: Board of Education v. Pico, 16 IND. L. REv. 559 (1983); Comment,
Board of Education v. Pico: School Library, Book Removal and the First Amendment, 14 ST.
MARY's L.J. 1063 (1983); Nocera, The Big Book-Banning Brawl, Tm NEw Rtpumic, Sept.
13, 1982, at 20.
51. F. FrrzGRALD, AmERICA R VISED (1979).
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books, while the John Birch Society "blamed the textbooks for the North
Koreans' success in 'brainwashing' a handful of prisoners of war. '"52
By the 1960's, however, the textbook protests came from the opposite end
of the political spectrum-the left and civil rights groups, which wanted fairer,
more accurate representation of minority contributions to society and the
elimination of patronizing and derogatory references. In this period and
thereafter, textbooks became the "lightning rods' 5 3 of American society. As
Frances FitzGerald notes, textbook protests used to occur only during times
of rapid political or social change. Today, the process of criticism is almost
institutionalized:
Now a great number of organizations and informal groups take an interest
in the content of texts . . . [and] a multitude of educational and civil-
rights groups have research departments devoted exclusively to the analysis
of textbooks. Many of these departments-on the right and on the left-
have with experience become sophisticated both in their analyses of text
materials and in their methods of approaching publishers, school boards,
and the federal bureaucracy. The public battle over texts is thus more
intense and more complicated than it has ever been before."
One reason textbooks became "lightning rods," at least for racial and ethnic
- minorities, was the perceived need to change the public's image of and attitudes
toward them. Attacking those attitudes and images through various media,
including textbooks, was complementary to a strategy of affirming political
and economic equality in schools, in housing, and at the workplace.
During the 1970's, political conservatives and religious fundamentalists began
to challenge the changes made in the 1960's. For example, in Kanawha Coun-
ty, West Virginia, parents 'and other citizens protested against some books
that had recently been acquired for classroom and library use. 5 The parents
complained that the books contained stories by black writers that were critical
of whites, an anti-war poem, and Mark Twain's satire on the Book of Genesis.
They succeeded in shutting down the schools with their demonstrations. After-
ward, a study was done by the National Education Association, which con-
cluded that the protest boiled down to a cultural conflict between liberal or
progressive secular values and the community's fundamental religious beliefs.
At least one publisher revised a literary anthology56 to meet the Kanawha
County standards. Similar clashes over texts sporadically arose around the
country," one of which gave rise to the Pico litigation. By 1981, the American
Library Association's Office for Intellectual Freedom reported over 900 book
removal controversies a year.
52. Id. at 38.
53. Id. at 42.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., The Schoolbook Rebellion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1974, at 12.
56. F. FrrzGEPALD, supra note 51, at 30.
57. Id. at 41.
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While textbook protests are nothing new, constitutional challenges to public
school library and textbook decisions have increased in the last ten years. 8
Before this time, only a handful of such cases had reached any state or federal
court.5 9 Many reasons exist for this increase. Dispute resolution in the public
schools is increasingly dominated by rules, formal procedures, legislation and
law suits. 60 It seems natural, or at least unavoidable, that the creeping legaliza-
tion apparent in collective bargaining, student records, desegregation, and treat-
ment of the handicapped, should spill over into the textbook area. Public
opinion polls also show declining confidence in professionals and public of-
ficials, perhaps reflecting less acceptance of decisions made by experts or elected
school representatives. 6' The view that public schools are above politics has
been rejected by many6" as a pervasive dissensus in values; the role of women,
for example, has taken hold. These forces may result in an increased will-
ingness of the political-process losers to battle in the courts. A current exam-
ple is the movement to dismantle whatever barriers have "separated govern-
ment from personal morality and religion." ' 63 As the Public Agenda Founda-
tion suggested in a recent study,
This mode of thinking can be seen... in increasing demands for "reviews"
of school text books. Many Americans have come to feel that the state
cannot be neutral to questions of lifestyle; they believe that the forces
of government should be harnessed to bring the country back to a par-
ticular moral and religious standard. 64
Textbook controversies arise from the clash of those who have influence
over curricular choices. School administrators assert their wisdom in educating
58. The 1970's produced many federal district court and three court of appeals school library
cases. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980);
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council
v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469
F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm. of Chelsea,
454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
59. See, e.g., Grosser v. Woollett, 45 Ohio Misc. 15, 341 N.E.2d 356 (1974); Todd v. Rochester
Community Schools, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972). See generally O'Neil, Libraries,
Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. CN. L. Rlv. 209 (1973).
60. See generally Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution, Distrust of Authority, and
Organizational Theory: Implementing Due Process for Students in the Public Schools, 1981 Wisc.
L. REv. 891.
61. See Yudof, supra note 60, at 894-96. The distrust of school authority is amply reflected
in the recent report of the Secretary of Education's Commission. TIm NATIONAL CommssION
ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK: Tim IMiPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM
(1983).
62. See generally F. WmT & M. KiEsT, POLITICAL AND SoCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION
(1972).
63. TiE PUBLIC AGENDA FOUNDATION, Tim SPEAKER AND rm LISTENER: A PUBLIC PERSPEC-
TIVE ON FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 8 (1980).
64. Id. See also Gabler & Gabler, Mind Control Through Textbooks, 64 Pm DELTA KAPPAN
96 (1982).
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the young."' Elected officials often perceive of themselves as conduits for
transporting community values into the schools. 66 Writers, editors, and
publishers are gravely concerned with their freedom of expression (and pro-
fits), and they fear government efforts to eliminate particular ideas and perspec-
tives from school classrooms. Parents seek to direct the upbringing of their
children and to inculcate particular secular and nonsecular values.67 Teachers
and librarians demand academic freedom-the right to be reasonably
autonomous in carrying out their professional responsibilities.6" Students may
assert a right to know, read, learn, acquire information, or a right not to
be subjected to materials they find fundamentally objectionable. 69
There are also concerns about government itself, the need to limit the im-
pact of government expression, and such concerns are now emerging in
academic freedom litigation."0 Government may take advantage of its captive
and immature audience in public schools to indoctrinate children to values
that enhance the status quo and to undermine their ability to act in the future
as "self-controlled" citizens7' who express their own reflective preferences
about political, economic, and social questions.' The public school's capaci-
ty to shape student beliefs and attitudes may be more destructive of democratic
values than regulation of student expression. 3 Government may accomplish
this through its teacher selection policies,7 ' its reliance on symbols and rituals,-
and its regulation of teacher expression in the classroom. 76 Library book selec-
65. See, e.g., T. vAN GEEL, AUTHoIUTY TO CONTROL THE SCHOOL PROGRAM (1976); F. WIRT
& M. KmsT, TsEa POLCAL WEB OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1972); F. FrrZoERALD, supra note 51;
E.M. ROOT, BRAINWASHIN nI THE HIGH SCHOOL (1958); O'Neil, supra note 59.
66. See generally M.G. YUDOF, D.L. KIP, T. vAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL PoucY
AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1982).
67. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S.
284 (1927). See generally Moskowitz, Parental Rights and State Education, 50 WAsH. L. REV.
623 (1975).
68. See, e.g., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Mailloux v. Kiley,
436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1971). See generally O'Neil, supra note 59; Van Alstyne, The Constitu-
tional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DusE L.J. 841; Goldstein, The Asserted
Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 1293 (1976).
69. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). See
generally O'Neil, supra note 59, at 216-39; Comment, First Amendment Right to Receive Infor-
mation, 55 TEx. L. REv. 511 (1977); Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is
There a Right to Have One's Child Excused From Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L.
REv. 871 (1977).
70. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979). See generally M.G. YUDOF, supra
note 34, at 215-18.
71. D. BOORSTIN, DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 10 (1974).
72. See M.G. YuDOF, supra note 34. See also Shiffrin, supra note 46, at 647-53; Kamenshine,
supra note 33.
73. But see J. TussmA, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND (1977).
74. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
75. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
76. See, e.g., James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972).
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tion for public schools is another excellent example of a policy arena in which
such dangers lurk. But for all its importance, courts have reacted tentatively,
inconsistently, and sometimes incoherently, notwithstanding (or perhaps
because of) the delicate and important nature of the problem.77
V. THE Pico LITIGATION
A. The Decision
In Board of Education v. Pico,78 the Supreme Court faced the public school
library book selection policies issue for the first time. The nine Justices filed
seven opinions. But despite the apparent chaos, there may be more consensus
than one would expect. Examining each of the opinions with care, one discovers
that a majority of the Justices do not believe that school boards have
unrestrained freedom to select library books; so there is a constitutional line
out there somewhere that may not be crossed. The fuzziness of the line and
the various interpretations of the facts create the confusion.
The events leading to Pico began in September 1975, when three school
board members attended a conference sponsored by a politically conservative
parents organization. While attending the conference they obtained a list of
objectionable books, including works by Malamud, Vonnegut, and Eldridge
Cleaver, ten of which they later found in their district's libraries. In February
1976, the board gave an "unofficial direction" that these books be removed
from the libraries and placed in the board's offices so the members could
read them. Word of the board's move leaked out. The board issued a press
release to justify its action and characterized the books as "anti-American,
anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy. '" 9 The superintendent ob-
jected to the action, reminding the board that it had a procedure for handling
complaints, which required the appointment of a committee to study the books.
The board refused to follow the procedure at first; but, later, after the books
had been removed and the board had made its views public, it appointed a
committee to study the books and to make recommendations. The committee
later reported its findings, recommending retention of at least five books,
placement of another on a restricted shelf, and removal of two others. The
committee either could not agree on or took no position on the remaining
books. The board substantially rejected the report, voting to retain only one
book and citing no reasons for its action.
77. Joseph DeMaistre once admonished that the pure of heart and righteous do not need
books; precepts are "imprinted by grace in our hearts." It is only because of our sinful ways
that "books and laws became necessary." J. DEMisme, ON GoD AND Sociary 30 (1959).
78. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
79. Id. at 857.
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The respondents, several students in the high school and the junior high
school, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 ° claiming their first amendment
rights had been violated by the books' removal. The district court granted
summary judgment, saying that no first amendment rights were implicated.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and remanded the case for
a full trial.8' Five Justices of the Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court
and voted to remand the case for trial. But Justice White did not join the
other four in their discussion of constitutional limits on the board. He wrote:
The unresolved factual issue, as I understand it, is the reason or reasons
underlying the school board's removal of the books. I am not inclined
to disagree with the Court of Appeals on such a fact-bound issue and
hence concur in the judgment of affirmance ...
The Court seems compelled to go further and issue a dissertation on
the extent to which the First Amendment limits the discretion of the school
board to remove books from the school library. I see no necessity for
doing so at this point.8"
Justice Brennan wrote for the Justices in the plurality, but Justice Blackmun
disagreed with Brennan's analysis of a student's right to receive information
so he wrote his own opinion concerning that issue. Thus, with only two of
his colleagues in tow, Justice Brennan spells out what he believes is a right
of students to receive information, but he limits the exercise of that right
to the school library. He concedes that school boards have broad discretion
in the management of school affairs and that schools are vehicles for "in-
culcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system." 83 Yet, he cites several Supreme Court cases8" to show not
only that students retain their first amendment rights, but also that a right
to receive information is inherent in that constitutional guarantee. Justice Bren-
nan, however, cautiously circumscribes this right to receive information:
Of course all First Amendment rights accorded to students must be con-
strued "in light of the special characteristics of the school environment."
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. . . .But the special characteristics
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
81. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
82. Pico, 457 U.S. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 864 (Brennan, J., citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979)).
84. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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of the school library make that environment especially appropriate for
the recognition of the First Amendment rights of students."1
The plurality then asserts that "[o]ur Constitution does not permit the
official suppression of ideas,' 6 and states the following test:
If petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents access
to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive
factor in petitioners' decision, then petitioners have exercised their discre-
tion in violation of the Constitution. To permit such intentions to control
official actions would be to encourage the precise sort of officially prescribed
orthodoxy unequivocally condemned in Barnette."
Justice Brennan limits this test to book removal decisions and does not address
book acquisition policies, presumably because the latter issue was not in the
case. He concludes by saying there is a question of material fact as to the
Board's intentions that should be considered by the trial courts on remand.
The plurality's opinion draws fire from Justices Blackmun, Burger, and
Rehnquist, all three of whom criticize the intelligibility and correctness of
the right to receive information in school libraries. But while Chief Justice
Burger seems to believe that school boards have unlimited authority in this
area, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist both admit some limit exists which
school boards may not venture beyond.
Justice Blackmun's opinion is sensitive to the subtleties and complexities
of the issue before the Court. He argues that the primary question is "how
to make the delicate accommodation between the limited constitutional restric-
tion that I think is imposed by the First Amendment, and the necessarily broad
state authority to regulate education. In starker terms, we must reconcile the
schools' 'inculcative' function with the First Amendment's bar on 'prescrip-
tions of orthodoxy." '" 8 The principle, Justice Blackmun believes, is "narrower
and more basic" than any right to receive information.
I do not suggest that the State has any affirmative obligation to provide
students with information or ideas, something that may well be associated
with a "right to receive." And I do not believe, as the plurality suggests,
that the right at issue here is somehow associated with the peculiar nature
of the school library; if schools may be used to inculcate ideas, surely
libraries may play a role in that process. Instead, I suggest that certain
forms of state discrimination between ideas are improper. In particular,
our precedents command the conclusion that the State may not act to
deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that
idea for partisan or political reasons."
85. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
86. Id. at 871.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 879. Compare id. with Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
89. Pico, 457 U.S. at 878-79 (citations omitted).
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Accordingly, the school itself, and not just the library, is a unique environ-
ment. But, precisely because of that, it is important that some limit, even
a symbolic one, be established as a means of balancing the two opposing
goals-inculcating values and educating free minds.
Justice Blackmun retains the motivation test; he appears to believe that
judges must satisfy themselves that school officials are aiming for the
Archimedean point. But he carefully explains that a motivation approach leaves
school boards with wide discretion. When the reason given for a removal deci-
sion is politically neutral, the first amendment will not be violated. FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation" would allow school boards to remove a book because
of offensive language, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,9 in his view, would
allow for removal if the book is thought to be psychologically or intellectually
inappropriate for an age group.
Justice Rehnquist also criticizes the right to receive information and the
illogical limits that Justice Brennan places on it.92 Although he joins Justice
Burger's dissenting opinion and harshly critiques Justice Brennan's position,
Justice Rehnquist appears to agree that school board discretion over library
books is limited. For example, he "cheerfully" concedes the hypothetical case
where a Democratic school board, motivated by party affiliation, removes
all books written by or in favor of Republicans, and the case of an all-white
school board removing all books which were written by blacks, or which
advocate racial equality or integration." Justice Rehnquist, however, does not
believe that such extreme cases would ever arise. 94 His disagreement with
Justices Blackmun and Brennan in this particular case appears to be in his
interpretation of the record: Justice Rehnquist does not see the procedural
irregularities and conflicting reasons for the books' removal by the school
board in Pico as evidence that the board could have been attempting to impose
an orthodoxy. With Justice Powell, 95 he believes that offensive language in
the forbidden books justified the school board's decision.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion does not address the extreme political
hypotheticals. 96 Instead, he relies on the judgment that federal courts have
no business becoming super-censors and deciding how local schools are to
be run.9 7 He concedes that students do not "shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," 9 but asserts
90. 438 U.S. 726, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
91. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
92. Pico, 457 U.S. at 910-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 907.
94. Id. at 908.
95. Id. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 886 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
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that this doctrine does not apply in Pico because no external restraints have
been placed on the students or their ability to express themselves." He
dogmatically declines to recognize the relationship between government
communication and freedom of expression, a relationship that nearly all of
his colleagues perceive. He also asks why, if a right to receive information
is so important, it should be limited to students. "This same need would
support a constitutional 'right' of the people to have public libraries as part
of a new constitutional 'right' to continuing adult education." 100
B. A Right to Receive Information
Although Justice Brennan aspires to define some limit on school boards'
actions, basing the limit on a right to receive information does not work,
theoretically or practically. A board's loss of power to select textbooks and
courses is inherently incompatible with the schooling enterprise. Justice
Rehnquist notes this in his dissenting opinion:
The idea that such students have a right to access, in the school, to infor-
mation other than that thought by their educators to be necessary is
contrary to the very nature of an inculcative education.' 0'
The "right to know," as articulated by the Supreme Court, is no more
than artistic camouflage to protect the interest of the willing speaker who
seeks to communicate with a willing listener. 2 Authors, editors, and publishers
do not have a constitutional right to have their books purchased by the state
for dissemination in public schools. No court has arrived at such a holding.
Justice Rehnquist called such a result "ludicrous." Yet all previously recognized
rights to receive information were predicated on the author's right to speak.' 0 3
The right to receive information would effectively place the power to edit
the curriculum in the hands of private, disinterested parties-neither parents
nor the state-and they would have an audience captured for them by govern-
mental coercion.
Further, it is one thing for the government to censor books and limit their
distribution, and quite another to require the state to purchase books in the
name of the first amendment rights of their authors. Surely absolutists such
as Justices Black and Douglas,' who did not believe that federal and state
99. Pico, 457 U.S. at 886 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 888.
101. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 914 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
102. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974).
103. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 912 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. See generally Powe, Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First Amendment,
74 COLUM. L. Rav. 371 (1974).
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governments had any authority to ban books on obscenity, national security,
or other grounds, would blanch at requiring governments to purchase Fanny
Hill, Ulysses, or The Pentagon Papers. By analogy, state officials may not
ban a magazine with offensive pictures or works of art, but this does not
necessarily mean that they are required to fund the magazine or to provide
a state-owned place to exhibit the art work.' 5 Even if this analogy is debatable,
qualitative judgments are an inherent part of the funding process-unless one's
position is that the state must support all magazine publishers and struggling
artists who seek state subsidies, if it supports any.'",
Practically, there are other problems. If students have a right to know,
then they should have a constitutional right to demand courses in public schools
that are not offered for financial or other reasons.'0I Any question in a class,
as a constitutional matter, would require an answer-no matter that the
question relates to the French Revolution and is asked in an algebra class,
or that no other student in the class has the desire to acquire such informa-
tion at that time and place. Justice Rehnquist poses an additional classroom
problem: will a teacher's absence from school due to illness constitute a denial
of access to information if part of the lesson plan must be dropped? Students,
presumably, would be entitled to choose their own books at government
expense. Librarians could not refuse to purchase a book sought by a student.
This right to receive information could be extended to non-school spheres.
Public libraries devoted to particular subjects, such as natural sciences, would
be required to purchase 19th-century Russian novels if requested to do so
by patrons. Requiring similar purchases by museum collections would logically
follow.
C. Is the School Library Unique?
An offshoot of the debate between Justices Brennan and Rehnquist over
whether students have a right to receive information is the question of whether
school libraries are unique. Justice Brennan argues that the school library
does play a unique role, and quotes a district court opinion that says that,
in the school library, students can explore the unknown and discover areas
of interest not covered in the classroom. Justice Rehnquist argues that this
uniqueness is a figment of Justice Brennan's imagination, that the school
library is merely a supplement to the curriculum, and that, as such, school
boards have as much discretion in determining the library's content as they
do in determining course content. Justice Rehnquist notes that, by limiting
105. See Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (lst Cir. 1976); Close v. Lederle,
424 F.2d 988 (Ist Cir. 1970). See generally Shiffrin, supra note 46, at 640-47.
106. See Shiffrin, supra note 46, at 640-47.
107. See, e.g., State v. School Dist., 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393 (1891). See generally YtmoF,
KiP, vAN GEEL, & LEvIN, supra note 66, at 176; Moskowitz, supra note 67.
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the right to receive information to school libraries, Justice Brennan shows
how uncomfortable he really is with the doctrine.
If communication inherently involves selectivity, and if library books and
classroom presentations are but two forms of communication, Justice
Rehnquist's analysis has much to commend it. Why should school officials
have less discretion in stocking school libraries than in allocating classroom
time? I 8 But classrooms and libraries are means of communication that have
quite different attributes. In the classroom, a teacher directs the transmission
of knowledge and values to a group of students. The same information
generally goes to all the students. The teacher can focus on only one subject
at a time, and therefore all students generally must focus on the same sub-
ject. But the library is different. No one person is in charge of the learning;
students proceed on an individual basis, learning on their own. The library
is a repository of many books, not just a single book for a single course.
In other words, books may convey conflicting messages to many readers at
the same time; the multiplicity of "voices" does not prevent effective com-
munication. A din of actual voices in the classroom, however, paralyzes the
communications process.
Libraries are filled with more than just classroom textbooks; they contain
popular and classical novels, nonfictional and fictional works written expressly
for children or teenagers, magazines, periodicals, and newspapers. The
difference between library collections and classroom texts reflects alternative
approaches to how competing views and perspectives should be balanced.
Textbooks attempt to achieve this balance in one volume. They are
"developed" by teams of people, not written solely by one or two people. 09
The name of a distinguished scholar frequently appears on the textbook,
presumably to add legitimacy or authority to the book. This can be seriously
misleading. Sometimes the historians named on the cover died years before
the current edition was published. Also, because history texts undergo fre-
quent revisions, a later edition may contain ideas opposite to or at least
"foreign" to those of the original author-historian." 0 These revisions incor-
porate new points of view as their publishers try to appeal to as many groups
as possible. Because the development of a new text is so expensive, publishers
can economically produce only one or two on the market at any one time."'
Consequently, all of them try to compete for the center of the market,
designing their books not to please anyone in particular but to be accep-
table to as many people as possible .... What a textbook reflects is thus
a compromise, an America sculpted and sanded down by the pressures
of diverse constituents and interest groups."-
108. See Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
109. F. FrrzGERAD, supra note 51, at 22.
110. See id. at 21.
111. Id. at 46.
112. Id. at 46-47.
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"Regular" books, on the other hand, are usually written by individuals,
not teams, who may have no desire to temper their views or to give space
to competing ideas. The author writes what he or she wants, not what fifteen
interest groups want. The author may wish to convey the truth as he or she
sees it, not some watered-down version of reality; or, the author may simply
wish to sell books by appealing to a mass or specialized audience. But a balance
of conflicting views within a single volume is rarely the objective. Balance
for the individual is achieved, if at all, by exposure to the whole array of
books. In the library, competing perspectives are accommodated by virtue
of the breadth of the collection. An analogy can be drawn to the single
newspaper and the whole communications market: one may not be able to
get all viewpoints from one newspaper, but elsewhere in the market, in
competing newspapers and magazines and from radio and television stations,' 3
the rest of the spectrum of opinion may be available. In this sense, libraries
cannot help but bring a greater diversity of views to students, and they can
serve as a safeguard against indoctrinating students from a single point of view.
The difference in the two types of books also stems from their purposes.
Textbooks are deliberately written with the indoctrination of children in mind.
History textbooks have functions and traditions independent of academic
history writing. I"4 First, they are nationalistic, recounting the history of America
as a nation-state, and not as an extension of civilization as it has already
developed. Second, the texts instruct and make no attempt to explore. "This
information is not necessarily what anyone considers the truth of things. Like
time capsules, the texts contain the truths selected for posterity." ",5 This selec-
tion of truths for deliberate socialization of the reader differs significantly
from the purpose of "regular" books, which generally have more modest
and tentative goals than to indoctrinate a whole generation of youngsters to
a common historical and cultural heritage.
The book selection process also varies in classrooms and libraries. Roughly
half of the states have statewide textbook adoption laws," 6 but library book
selection is generally left to the local school districts and their librarians. The
problem of an orthodoxy imposed by the school board remains, but is certainly
preferable to statewide book selection, where the potential for imposed or-
thodoxy has more serious and far-reaching consequences.
D. Motivation Test
The Pico Court-at least in the plurality opinion-ultimately tries to resolve
113. See generally G.H. SiAPIO, P.B. KURLAND, & J.P. MERCURIO, "CABLE SPEECH": THE
CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION ch. 5 (1983); B. SCHMIT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS.
PUBLIC ACCESS (1976); Powe, "Or of the [Broadcast] Press", 55 TEx. L. REV. 39, 56-57 (1976).
114. F. FITZGERALD, supra note 51, at 47.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 32.
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the book selection issue on the basis of a motivation test. As Professor Stone
has urged, motivation analysis in freedom of expression cases is particularly
appealing where we have reason to suspect government bias or prejudice."1 7
Such an analysis is less an effort to locate an Archimedean point between
indoctrination and autonomy than it is a determination that public officials
have failed to pursue the Archimedean objective. But determining motivation
is a sticky business. The test is not easy to apply. And, as Justice Rehnquist
points out, if one is concerned about denial of access to information, a motiva-
tion test is the wrong test.
[B]ad motives and good motives alike deny access to the books removed.
If Justice Brennan truly recognizes a constitutional right to receive infor-
mation, it is difficult to see why the reason for the denial makes any
difference. Of course Justice Brennan's view is that intent matters because
the First Amendment does not tolerate an officially prescribed orthodoxy.
... But this reasoning mixes First Amendment apples and oranges. The
right to receive information differs from the right to be free from an
officially prescribed orthodoxy. Not every educational denial of access to
information casts a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." 8
In spite of its fragmentation in Pico, it is in the area of motivation that
the Court appears to reach some consensus. A majority of the Justices support
two underlying themes that could refine Justice Brennan's motivation test.
The first is the idea that blatant political orthodoxy will not be tolerated. 119
The second is that a school board's removal decision is legitimate if it is based
on the educational suitability of the books. 2 ' Objections to obscene words
or sexual themes in a book are viewed as premised on educational and not
political or ideological grounds. The relationship between these two themes
and the quest for the Archimedean balance is complex.
By identifying political orthodoxy as a category for intense examination,
the assumptions may be that there are few political truths (or at least that
there is more dissensus as to those truths), that government is less trustworthy
to assess and promote political truths (given its interest in self-perpetuation),' 2'
and that politics is an identifiable category 12 (and not an ubiquitous' element
in all aspects of education). By creating a category of educational suitability,
the Justices implicitly contend that education is or should be above politics,'23
that educational truths are more easily discerned than political truths, 24 and
117. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
118. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 917 (1982).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See generally F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PmIosoPmcAH. ENQUTR;y 81-82 (1982).
122. See generally Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Speech, 40 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 519, 537-42 (1979).
123. But see, e.g., Peterson, The Politics of American Education, in RviEw OF REsEAcH
IN EDUCATION 348 (F. Kerlinger & J. Carroll eds. 1974); D. ROGERS, 110 LIVINGsT N ST -EE:
PoLmcs AND BUREAUCRACy IN THE NEW YORK Crry SCHOOL SYSTEM (1968).
124. But see J. COONs & S. SuGARmAN, EDUCATiON BY CHOiCE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL
(1978).
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that government is to be trusted more in the educational sphere. 2 All of
these propositions are controversial, but perhaps the most controversial
assumption is that sexual morality should be classified with education and
not with politics. This assumption presumably reflects the view that there is
more consensus on sexual morality than political morality and that govern-
ment can be trusted to "edit" the library collection and curriculum to bring
forth those consensual truths.
If the law legitimizes educational suitability as a basis for book removal,
the practical result of Pico may be that school boards can often immunize
their book selection decisions from constitutional attack simply by invoking
the proper educational ground. Rather than merely labeling books as "anti-
American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy," the school board
will learn to pronounce objectionable books as "poor pedagogical tools" or
"lacking educational value." These magic words will suffice unless judges,
in the light of the evidence adduced, perceive that the articulated reasons are
a subterfuge for illegitimate reasons. The board in Pico realized this, but not
until it was too late in the game.
In this light, consider Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp.,26 a
case in which the school board was apparently attempting to eliminate feminist
teaching and literature from its high schools. The school board removed a
values clarification textbook from school premises, giving the book to a senior
citizens' group for public burning. It also refused to allow four books that
had been ordered for a "Women in Literature" couirse to be used.'27 Under
a new policy prohibiting reading materials that might be objectionable, the
board also excised portions of Student Critic and permanently removed Go
Ask Alice from the school library. Furthermore, the board failed to follow
its established school procedures for book selection decisions, eliminated seven
courses from the curriculum, and did not rehire the English teacher who
planned to offer the "Women in Literature" course.28
The plaintiffs alleged that these actions were taken largely because particular
words in the books offended the school board's social, political, and moral
tastes. 29 The court found this allegation insufficient, however, because school
boards are supposed to act on such tastes and beliefs in making book selec-
tion, curricular, and other decisions. In the court's words, "the amended
complaint nowhere suggests that in taking these actions defendants have been
guided by an interest in imposing some religious or scientific orthodoxy to
eliminate a particular kind of inquiry generally."' 30 Apparently, if one is to
125. But see J.S. Mill, On Liberty, in THE UTrrARus 586-87 (1961).
126. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
127. The books were Growing Up Female in America, Go Ask Alice, The Bell Jar, and The
Stepford Wives.
128. Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1302-03.
129. Id. at 1302.
130. Id. at 1306.
[Voi.59:527
LIBRARY BOOK SELECTION
credit the court's account of the case, plaintiffs erred in not specifically alleg-
ing that the board was attempting to eliminate feminist thought from the public
schools.' The court was thus spared the unpleasant and difficult task of
distinguishing between judgments based on educational suitability and those
designed to impose an impermissible orthodoxy.
Pico and Zykan both show the kind of conjunction of facts that shed light
on a school board's motivation to censor or to edit. The book selection deci-
sions clearly did not rest on considerations of economy or scarce resources.
No one urged that the books were too expensive to dust. The reasonable
evidentiary presumption, that the failure of the board to abide by its own
procedures is a sign that it is engaging in censorship, was not rebutted by
the extrinsic evidence. 3 In Zykan, a series of related but ad hoc determina-
tions all pointed in the direction of eliminating all feminist thought from the
schools,'3 while in Pico, the switch in reasons given for removing the books
was evidence that the board was trying to cover its tracks. In Zykan and Pico,
the school boards were not selecting from among disciplines or subjects so
much as they were addressing themselves to a current and controversial political
issue that cut across many disciplines. As Professor Schauer has noted, free
speech concerns vary "in direct proportion to the degree of uncertainty in-
herent in the category of proposition involved."'' 3 Removing books on
Lysenkoism may not be the constitutional equivalent of removing books on
the New Deal or civil rights. 35
The use of the motivation test as a check on school boards' authority in
extreme cases implies that school boards and librarians will necessarily have
to consider the constitutionality of their actions. By setting an outer limit
they may not exceed, they should ask themselves if they are removing a book
because they genuinely believe it is not suitable for children or because they
disagree with its underlying philosophy. This notion conforms to the theory
that the courts do not have a monopoly on constitutional interpretation and
that all public officials who swear or affirm their allegiance to upholding the
Constitution are obligated to consider the Constitution in their decision
making. 3
Support for this theory comes from the fact that there is no judicial
supremacy clause in the Constitution and from the idea that a court's reliance
on "a presumption of constitutionality" of official acts is meaningless unless
131. See id. at 1309 (Swygert, J., concurring in part).
132. See also Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd., 638 F.2d 438, 442 n.6 (2d Cir.
1980) (opinion of Newman, J.).
133. Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1309 (Swygert, J., concurring in part).
134. F. SCRAUER, supra note 121, at 30. See also Scanlon, supra note 122.
135. Cf. Yudof, supra note 48, at 706-07.
136. See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 585 (1975).
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the officials involved have actually contemplated constitutional requirements.'17
Professor Morgan believes that the judicial supremacy theory could only be
based on some uniqueness in the judicial process or in judges' capabilities. 138
But the elements of constitutional interpretation are not unique. Constitu-
tional interpretation, as Professor Morgan argues, involves institutional at-
tributes and procedures that have been successfully employed by non-judicial
institutions as they confront constitutional questions that may never reach
the courts. '39 These involve an attitude toward interpretation that is characterized
by thoroughness and by an effort to disentangle policy questions from the con-
stitutional issues. The participants must be qualified. Legal training helps, but
is not necessary if the participants are moderate, willing to reason and deliberate,
and have some concept of constitutional leadership.
Whatever the mode of consideration, there must be a fair representation
of all interests or geographical regions, and there must be adequate rules and
procedures that promote discussion, minimize polarization, and lead to an
effective juxtaposition of the issues involved. Morgan cites examples to show
that when all or most of these elements were present, Congress or its commit-
tees thoughtfully dealt with constitutional issues and members were able to
reach decisions based on the competing principles presented, as opposed to
the policies and politics involved.' °
This theory of multi-institutional, constitutional interpretation is eminently
suited to decisionmaking by school boards in book selection controversies.
School boards generally are of manageable size, and they generally consider
issues as a committee of the whole.' 4 ' Because many decisions will never be
challenged in court, or because, if they are, the courts are likely to defer to
the school board's wisdom on educational suitability, board members may
often be the only people seriously considering the constitutional issues. In
the light of judicial deference to their book selection decisions,' 42 school board
members have a particular responsibility to assess the constitutionality of their
actions-only board members can exercise the self-restraint that will prevent
the extreme cases from arising.
This underlying theme of Pico suggests that perhaps the most important
limit on school board book selection policies will be symbolic. The courts
should not be involved in the school's day-to-day decisionmaking on book
selection. Some lower court opinions read like book reviews, with the court
deciding the case on the basis of whether its evaluation of a book is favorable
or unfavorable. ' This kind of petty decisionmaking is unprincipled and
137. P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEcisiONMAKING 147 (1983).
138. D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND Tn CONSTITUTION 335 (1966).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See generally Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74
MICH. L. Rsv. 1373 (1976); E. BOLMMIER, Tr SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE (1968).
142. See, e.g., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
143. See, e.g., Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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substitutes judicial discretion for that of duly elected and appointed school
officials. But if school boards know that the courts will sometimes get in-
volved, even if only in extreme cases, and if they take their constitutional respon-
sibilities seriously and restrain themselves accordingly, Pico may serve as an
effective constitutional limit, even if that limit is poorly defined and mostly sym-
bolic and self-enforced.
VI. BEYOND UNCONSTITUTIONAL MOTIVATION: UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DELEGATIONS AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
There are other judicial approaches to book selection policies, some more
probable than others, that would not rely on a motivation test. One is premised
on the doctrine of irrevocability of delegated authority: school boards, hav-
ing generally delegated authority over book selection to others, may not in-
voke that delegation in particular cases simply because of their disagreement
with the specific results produced by the previously mandated process. Another
approach, which is more speculative and less appealing, would call for limited
application of notions of procedural due process. The two alternatives are
explored below, in greater detail.
A. Irrevocable Delegations
Analysis of the delegation doctrine requires focusing on what is meant by
such words as government, state, and public officials. Governments are made
up of people who have different perspectives and different places in the official
hierarchy. Realistically, government communication powers and activities are
so extensive that, inevitably, editorial responsibility is delegated to professional
editors, those "street-level bureaucrats" 4" who are responsible for the actual
delivery of services. In the education context, the state legislature could apply
its editorial judgments and vote on each book to be used in every school in
the state. Instead, authority is delegated to state departments of education,
state textbook commissions, local school boards, principals, teachers, and
school librarians. This delegation of editorial authority, which often parallels
the balkanization of governments responsible for education, is a bulwark
against the centralized orchestration of a publicly established orthodoxy14'5 that
Justice Jackson warned us about more than forty years ago. '6 Safety lies
in keeping politicians too busy to intervene in daily decisions about library
books, though they may and should direct overall policy. What is to be feared
are hyperkinetic politicians who seek to intervene in day-to-day book selec-
tion and curricular decisions.
144. The phrase is taken from Weatherley & Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institu-
tional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education Reform, 47 HAuv. EDUc. REv. 171 (1977).
145. See generally M.G. YuDoF, supra note 34, at 243.
146. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
1984]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
The concept of delegated editorial responsibility is a powerful one. Consider,
for example, the doctrine of academic freedom for teachers.' 7 The cases in
which the doctrine has been applied seem difficult to justify,"'4 and the Supreme
Court has never embraced the doctrine explicitly or adequately distinguished
it from traditional first amendment doctrine.' 49 Should the fortuity of speak-
ing and teaching for a living entitle an instructor to some special autonomy
that other government employees do not share? 5 ' Is it because they deal in
words? May librarians assert a right to academic freedom? Why should a
government employee who purchases books have any greater latitude than
a government supply officer responsible for ordering paper and office equip-
ment? Part of the answer, surely, is that books and words have a peculiarly
important position in a democracy. But this answer could equally support
an argument for greater supervision of teachers and librarians in public schools.
What students learn is more important than which copying machine is
purchased by a state highway department. If the government is truly an editor,
then why should the government not have the same rights' that private
schools,' newspapers, and broadcast stations have to control, hire, and fire?
5 3
The answer lies in the place that teachers and librarians occupy in the system
of government expression. The greater the ability of higher echelon officials
to control what goes on in each school environment, library, and classroom,
the greater the danger of the promulgation of a uniform message to captive
listeners will be. If teachers were automatons, required to adhere rigidly to
lesson plans and book selections, and if librarians were responsible only for
processing book orders, with no discretion over what was ordered, ideological
indoctrination would become more likely. In practice, varying discretion is
given to teachers and librarians and the system works tolerably well.
What happens if editorial authority is not delegated to teachers or librarians?
Is there a constitutional rule, derived from the first amendment concern for
government established orthodoxy, that would require such delegations?
Tempting though another answer might be, the answer is no."" If, for exam-
ple, a school board establishes firm rules in advance which allow it to make
147. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316
F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). See also sources cited supra note 68.
148. See Goldstein, supra note 68; Van den Haag, Academic Freedom in the United States,
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515 (1963).
149. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). See generally T. EMERSON, Tn SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION
593-626 (1970).
150. See Goldstein, supra note 68.
151. See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT,
STANDARDS RELATING TO SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION 91 (American Bar Association, 1977).
152. Cf. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1582).
153. Cf. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1274 (1983).
154. See M.G. YUDOF, supra note 34, at 244.
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judgments about textbook and library acquisitions, and if the school board
in fact makes such decisions over time, then its decisionmaking apparatus
should not be subject to constitutional attack on the ground that delegation
and division of authority over textbooks and library books is required. 55 The
student newspaper cases, however, implicitly reach a contrary result.1" Once
a public school establishes a newspaper, although it need not have done so,
most courts have held that it may not interfere with the editorial judgments
of the student editors.' 57 The cases do not appear to turn on how much editorial
discretion was given the students or whether faculty supervision was established
in advance through duly promulgated rules.
How then does one explain cases like Parducci v. Rutland'" in which Judge
Johnson upheld the teacher's right to select a book of her students over the
protestations of school authorities? Cary v. Board of Education,'"59 a recent
Tenth Circuit case, begins to provide the answer. Judge Logan, in referring
to Parducci and similar academic freedom cases, noted that
[t]he cases which held for the teachers and placed emphasis upon teachers'
rights to exercise discretion in the classroom, seemed to be situations where
school authorities acted in the absence of a general policy, after the fact,
and had little to charge against the teacher other than the assignment with
which they were unhappy.
60
If higher authorities have no policy on book assignment or selection and
thereby delegate such authority on de facto basis to teachers and librarians,
they cannot later intervene in an ad hoc manner to limit the dissemination
of the books or their acquisition. Similarly, where school authorities have
promulgated in advance a set of rules delegating authority to teachers,
librarians, or special textbook committees, they should not be able to undo
that delegation on a selective basis merely because they are dissatisfied with
the results of that delegation in a particular instance.' 6' In other words, the
first amendment should be construed to embody a doctrine of irrevocable
delegations of authority in book selection policies, at least where the revoca-
tion operates retroactively or on an ad hoc basis.
The irrevocable delegation doctrine is rooted in Supreme Court opinions
that require federal agencies to follow their own procedures, even if those
155. Cf. Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd., 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Cary
v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
156. See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453
F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 296 N.E.2d 238, 343 N.Y.S.2d
333 (1973). See generally YuDOF, Kump, vAN GEEL, & LEVN, supra note 66, at 201-05.
157. But see INs'rrruT oF JtDIcIAJ. ADMMsTRATIoN, supra note 151, at 91-94. See generally
Comment, Student Editorial Discretion, the First Amendment, and Public Access to the Campus
Press, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 1089 (1983).
158. 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
159. 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
160. Id. at 541.
161. But see Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd., 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
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procedures would not be constitutionally required in the first instance under
the due process clause.1 62 One might argue that established procedures for
book selection and removal create a sort of property interest, relying upon
expectations which are embodied in positive law as to how the state will behave.
A student may not have a "right to know" and a publisher may have no
right to government largesse, but they should have a right to compel a govern-
ment entity to honor the procedures that have been established for determin-
ing what is taught and which books will be used.
Less technically, an analogy may be drawn to the obscenity area where,
as Professor Monaghan has noted, "the Court has placed little reliance upon
the due process requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, but
instead has turned directly to the first amendment as the source of rules." 163
In both situations the fundamental problem is a distrust of government
decisionmaking relating to sensitive free speech issues. Obscenity may become
a catch-all label for censoring objectionable political and literary works. Educa-
tional suitability may become an excuse for imposing an ideological orthodoxy.
If government communication in schools may so overwhelm students that they
risk losing their ability to think critically and independently, then the irrevocable
delegation doctrine may make good sense. Courts are not put in the position
of deciding what is indoctrination and what is education. The public schools
remain free to alter prospectively their decisional structure.' 6' Having created
a structure which is conducive to decentralized, balkanized, professional
decisionmaking about schoolbooks (whether intended or not), school
authorities should be required to abide by that structure. If they wish to take
on the job of editing the school curriculum and selecting books, it should
be a full-time job. 65
From a delegation perspective, it should make no difference whether the
decision in question deals with book removal or book selection. In Pico, Justice
Brennan limits his analysis to book removals. The extension of the right to
book acquisition opens a can of worms that he wishes to avoid. But as Justice
Rehnquist noted,
[i]f a school board's removal of books might be motivated by a desire
to promote favored political or religious views, there is no reason that
its acquisition policy might not also be so motivated. And yet the "pall
of orthodoxy" cast by a carefully executed book-acquisition program
apparently would not violate the First Amendment under Justice Bren-
nan's view.",
162. See, e.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974).
163. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HAiv. L. REv. 518 (1970). See, e.g.,
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S.
717 (1961). See generally L. TRIE, AmEsicAN CONSTnamoNAL LAw §§ 12-36 (1978).
164. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
165. See M.G. YuDoF, supra note 34, at 240-45.
166. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 910 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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An irrevocable delegation approach could manageably apply to both removal
and acquisition of library books.
The irrevocability doctrine has not always been clearly applied by the courts.
In the Cary case, the school board had established a High School Language
Arts Text Evaluation Committee to review materials for language arts courses.
The committee consisted of teachers, administrators, parents, and students,
and apparently was charged with reporting its book recommendations to the
school board. The books were not to be purchased by the district, but rather,
by individual students. Only one book was rejected by a majority of the
committee, but nine more were rejected in a minority report. The school board
approved 1,275 books for the language arts classes, but rejected ten others-
only six of which were listed in the minority report. The excluded books
included Clockwork Orange (Anthony Burgess), The Exorcist (William P.
Blatty), Coney Island of the Mind (Lawrence Ferlinghetti), and Kaddish and
Other Poems (Allen Ginsberg).
The court upheld the exclusions, reasoning that if the board could decide
not to offer contemporary poetry and if it could select the major textbook
for the course, it could also prevent the assignment of other books. 167 But
the relevant question might well have been framed in terms of an irrevocable
delegation doctrine. The board established a review procedure, and it is not
all clear that the board had abided by it. The case should have been remanded
for such a determination. For example, was the board required to select books
on the basis of the information provided by the majority and minority reports?
If it was free to disregard all recommendations, then what was the point of
the procedure? Was the board, like the committee members, required to follow
established standards and to give reasons for rejecting particular books?
References to the general statutory powers of school boards do not answer
these questions.
Perhaps the most plausible explanation of the Cary case is that the parties
stipulated that the books were not obscene, that no systematic attempt had
been.made to exclude any particular philosophy, and that a "constitutionally
proper decision-maker" might well determine that the books were proper for
high school language arts classes.' 68 The presumption of censorship of ideas
that an ad hoc revocation of the Committee's book selection authority normally
entails, assuming that this was the case, was rebutted by plaintiffs' own con-
cessions. The only plausible reason for the exclusion was a judgment about
the educational appropriateness of the books. Defendants conceded that
students were not prohibited from reading the books and that teachers were
free to comment upon them and to recommend them. 69 Only protracted discus-
sion, which would in effect reinstate the forbidden books, was prohibited.
167. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979).
168. Id. at 538.
169. Id. at 543.
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But even so, the Cary court might have held the board to its own rules, thereby
retaining a structure which preserved first amendment values.
In contrast to Cary, the court in Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education""
relied heavily on the failure of the board of education to follow its own
procedures'' in a decision to remove all and then parts of Ms. magazine from
the school library. In that case, the board approved guidelines for the selec-
tion of instructional materials, delegating its editorial function to the "pro-
fessionally trained personnel employed by the school district.""'7 The guidelines
contained criteria for selection, including quality of presentation,
appropriateness for age, subject, ability levels, and literary quality. The
guidelines also provided that the chosen books should help students be aware
of the contributions of both sexes and of various religious, ethnic, and cultural
groups, and that on controversial issues, the collection should be balanced
and insure the representation of various points of view.
In the event of a citizen complaint or question about book selection, the
guidelines provided for appeals to an Instructional Materials Reconsideration
Committee, with subsequent appeals to the superintendent and school board.'1
3
Bypassing these procedures, a board member presented a formal resolution
to remove Ms. magazine from the school library, and the resolution was
approved by the board despite the protestations of the superintendent that
the established procedures should be followed. The court held that the board
"was required to follow [the guidelines] in its attempt at removal of Ms.
magazine from the shelves of the high school library."' 7 This conclusion was
sufficient to support the court's order against banning the magazine from
the school library. It was unnecessary for the court to address broader cen-
sorship issues, relating to whether the alleged "sexual overtones" of the
magazine were simply a pretext for banning an objectionable point of view. '
The irrevocability doctrine could have been the basis for the Supreme Court's
decision in Pico. Ten books, including The Fixer, Slaughterhouse Five, The
Naked Ape, and Soul on Ice, were removed from the school libraries. This
was accomplished, as Judge Sifton in the lower court noted with amusing
understatement, through "unusual and irregular intervention in school libraries'
operations by persons not routinely concerned with such matters."'7 6 Over
the repeated objections of the superintendent, the board then bypassed normal
selection and removal procedures and banned the books. The board eventual-
ly appointed a committee to read the books and make recommendations to
170. 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
171. But see Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd., 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
172. Salvail, 469 F. Supp. at 1271.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1273.
175. Id. at 1274.
176. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 414 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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the board, but not until after the board has issued a press release condemning
the books. After the lawsuit was filed, the board members emphasized that
their decision was premised on "the repellent and vulgar language present
in the books."' 77
If the board had followed its own procedures from the beginning, rather
than circumventing them at every turn, its decisions would have been more
insulated from legal attack. This process would have required a full investiga-
tion into the books and a hearing; it would have resulted in less of an
appearance of prejudgment by the board. Perhaps observance of the pro-
cedures would have led to a more timely and thorough exploration of the
constitutional issues. But the disregard of its procedures strengthened the in-
ference that the board was improperly motivated to remove ideologically ob-
jectional books.
B. Procedural Due Process
Apart from bolstering the voluntary delegation of school board authority,
one may think about applying more traditional due process techniques to the
book selection process. Only one court has adopted this position. In Loewen
v. Turnipseed,'" a case arising in the Northern District of Mississippi, a rating
committee, appointed by the Governor and the State Superintendent of Educa-
tion, approved only one book, Your Mississippi, for purchase by the State
Textbook Purchasing Board. Although the board could adopt up to five books,
the rating committee refused to rate the other book under consideration,
Mississippi: Conflict and Change. The latter was a new book that, "unlike
the old textbook . . . . discussed racial conflict frankly and pointed out the
contributions that black people had made to the state."' 9 It was written by
faculty and students at Tougaloo and Millsaps Colleges. Several textbook
publishers had turned it down, presumably because it was too controversial,
but the authors finally found a willing publisher at Random House. Even
though other text allegedly had not been updated for ten years and did not
discuss racial conflict, the rating committee vote to rate it and to not rate
the new book. "' The vote split clearly along racial lines: the five white members
of the committee voted for the old book and the two black members voted
to rate both books. The purchasing board was constrained to purchase only
those books rated by the committee. The court held that the selection was
motivated by racial discrimination, was intended to perpetuate segregation,
and was, therefore, unconstitutional.' 8'
177. Id. at 411.
178. 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
179. F. FrrzGE.a.m, supra note 51, at 29.
180. Id.
181. Loewen, 488 F. Supp. at 1154-55.
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Along the way, the court held that the rating committee procedure for select-
ing textbooks was also unconstitutional. Mississippi law did not provide for
review of the rating committee's decision; thus, it declined to give "those
adversely affected by it a voice in the matter."' 8 Since the publishers of the
books were given an opportunity to present their positions to the committee,
presumably the court was referring to the authors, students, faculty, and school
districts across the state. Indeed, they were the plaintiffs.
The Loewen holding appears difficult to sustain, for book purchasing deci-
sions appear to be a legislative, and not an adjudicative, matter., 83 A govern-
mental body is not constitutionally required to hold an adversary hearing in
deciding to award a construction contract for a public building. 84 But, perhaps,
as in the case of the irrevocable delegation doctrine, first amendment interests
might trigger doctrinal innovation under the due process clause.' 5
The stigma'86 or stigma plus 87 cases, decided under the due process clause,
may provide a rough parallel. Where governmental communications may
stigmatize a person and where that person is simultaneously deprived of some
entitlement, the government may be required to hold a hearing to determine
the facts of the matter. The notion suggests that a liberty interest has been
violated. A classic case would be the dismissal of a public employee, accom-
panied by publicized charges that he had engaged in some reprehensible
behavior.'88 As I have argued elsewhere, these cases are best understood from
the perspective of government expression that may do significant damage to
an individual's life chances. 88 In a modern industrial society, widely publicized
government accusations may harm a person as much as the loss of liberty
through incarceration or the taking of his physical property. A hearing
requirement does not mean that the government may not speak badly about
individuals, but only that, under some circumstances, it must abide by
procedures designed to insure the accuracy of the government's remarks.
In Loewen, government may be viewed as expressing itself through its
textbook selections; the potential reputational harm to authors, students, and
others is great, and perhaps a due process hearing makes sense despite the
lack of fit between these facts and prior due process decisions. This aspect
of Loewen, among others, is dubious. The reputational harm is no greater
than that from any governmental decision to buy from one private contractor
rather than from another. Even affirmance of the due process approach would
require the delineation of some limiting principles. Surely, governments are
182. Id. at 1153.
183. See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Rv. 1267 (1975).
184. KENNETH C. DAvis, ADmiNIsTRATrvE LAW (3d ed. 1972).
185. See Monaghan, supra note 163.
186. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
187. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). See generally L. TRIE, supra note 163, at §§ 10-11.
188. See L. TRBE, supra note 163, at §§ 10-11.
189. M.G. YUDOF, supra note 34, at 263-80.
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not required to hold a due process hearing every time they wish to make a
decision about funding research, purchasing a book, subsidizing the arts, or
publishing a manuscript at the Government Printing Office.
A distinction might be drawn between books that may be marketed only
in schools, and those that have a more general market. Or, an inquiry might
be made into the reasons for rejection of a textbook. Some reasons are more
stigmatizing and financially devastating than others. But, in the last analysis,
the due process approach does not appear to be very promising, as the element
of communication is minimal in book selection decisions.
Finally, one should note that, in Loewen, the court did not order the rating
committee to alter its procedures to conform to its opinion. Rather, the court
ordered the defendants to approve the new textbook.'90 The practical result
of the case was that both books under consideration were approved, and that
local Mississippi school districts and dioceses were free to choose the one that
they preferred. This is indeed a Solomonic remedy. But more importantly,
the decision effectively placed the power to make textbook selections in the
hands of local communities and local school officials. Not only is this consis-
tent with the irrevocable delegation doctrine, but also it has overtones of struc-
tural due process. ' 9'
Perhaps, as in the Supreme Court's pornography, 92 school financing,
193
and zoning' 94 cases, the district court intended to emphasize the need for
community, and not statewide, decisionmaking.' g9 If schools are to reflect
the values of the communities in which they are located, then each community
should be able to determine its own standards for schoolbooks. Parents and
publishers do not decide, but neither should distant state officials. While the
constitutional underpinnings of the result are highly questionable, community
decisionmaking is consistent with both the mission of schools and the first
190. Loewen, 488 F. Supp. at 1155.
191. As Professor Tribe has explained structural due process,
We may begin by observing that all ... of the constitutional models thus far
examined have been concerned with ways of achieving substantive ends through
variations in governmental structures and processes of choice.
... [A structural justice] model [is] concerned [with] . . . match[ing] decision
structures with substantive human ends....
... I mean [then] the approach to constitutional values that either mandates
or at least favors the use of particular decisional structures for specific substantive
purposes in concrete contexts, without drawing on any single generalization about
which decisional pattern is best suited, on the whole, to which substantive alms.
Tribe, The Emerging Reconnection of Individual Rights and Institutional Design: Federalism,
Bureaucracy, and Due Process of Lawmaking, 10 CREIOHoN L. Ray. 433, 440-41 (1977). See,
e.g., Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88 (1976). See also Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976).
192. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
193. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
194. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Compare id. with Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
195. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 163, at 974-90.
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amendment interest in avoiding wholesale indoctrination through a centralized
decisionmaking process.
VII. RESERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS
Having examined the recent case law on library book selection and removal
policies, a number of observations and reservations are in order. The
irrevocable delegation doctrine is the wisest compromise in terms of avoiding
the quagmire of motivation theory and in terms of playing to the demonstrated
competencies of courts. On the other hand, it is not as protective of first
amendment values as the "right to know" and motivation approaches, and
it invites school boards to take on limited review functions that may meet
the letter if not the spirit of the doctrine. The constitutional status of the
doctrine is not assured, with recent Supreme Court dicta pointing in the
opposite direction. ' 96
With regard to traditional due process guarantees, recent Supreme Court
decisions do not bode well for their extension even to a limited class of book
selection cases.197 Interestingly enough, the structural due process approach,
requiring that local communities make book decisions, is highly consistent
with the prevailing philosophy of many of the Justices.198 But the precedents
are few, they are easily distinguishable, and it is far from certain that the
Court will accept the structural due process positions of such scholars as
Professor Laurence Tribe and Professor (now Justice) Hans Linde.1 99
But what remains of the motivation test embraced by the Pico Court? It
remains an open question whether the sorts of motivation lines that the
Supreme Court and the circuit courts have sought to draw are workable or
desirable. How does one know an "orthodoxy" when one sees it? Is not all
education centered on establishing certain orthodoxies and editing out of the
curriculum ideas and facts that are deemed wrong or unimportant by the
electorate?
When Justice Stevens states that "a university legitimately may regard some
subjects as more relevant to its educational mission than others," one can
hardly dissent. When he further notes that a university "may not allow its
196. See Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 n.8 (1978) ("lB]oth
Service [v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957)] and Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) ...
enunciate principles of federal administrative law rather than of constitutional law binding upon
the States.") But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
197. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976);
Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). But see Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property, " 62 CoR-
NELL L. Rv. 405 (1977); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property". Adjudicative Due Pro-
cess in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977).
198. See supra notes 191-94.
199. See supra note 191.
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agreement or disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular speaker"2 ° to
be decisive, one begins to wonder whether the distinction between relevance
and disagreement is naive and illusive. To raise a specific example, the Pico
and Zykan decisions assume that the exclusion of sexually oriented books
or books with dirty words is constitutionally permissible. Why is this not as
much of an imposition of values as is implicit in the exclusion of a feminist,
religious, or civil rights point of view? Why is the inculcation of standards
of morality and sexual behavior somehow more legitimate? Why is not the
judicial attitude toward sexually oriented books inconsistent with the premise
that school authorities may not pass on the ideological appropriateness of
books for youngsters in the schools? On the other hand, if sexually explicit
books may be removed, why cannot other offensive books be removed? Why
should public schools be constitutionally forbidden from honoring the views
of parents in a particular community who may not wish that their sons and
daughters be subjected to deviant political perspectives?
The Court's motivation test essentially boils down to a classification of
government expression; current political ideology is more suspect than past
political ideology (that of the "Founding Fathers"), sexual morality, civic
virtue, science, and language. With this one exception, born of a distrust of
government efforts to speak to current political controversies, the Court
eschews any effort to locate the Archimedean point between critical reflec-
tion and socialization to cultural values. Perhaps even this modest effort goes
too far, for a categorization of such expression is not a substitute for a
conceptualization of the Archimedean balance. But the inability of judges to
resolve an ancient enigma suggests what everyone should realize: the primary
restraints on excessive government communication activities and on the
promulgation of official orthodoxies, in the schools and elsewhere, are political,
social, and attitudinal. 0 ' A society must nurture and sustain its own living
traditions;20 2 philosophers and judges alone will not define our future
possibilities.
Restraint depends on the independence of private publishers and their
willingness to battle for their first amendment beliefs. It depends on persuading
public officials and the public itself that ideological censorship is not the
solution. It depends on revitalizing traditions of local control of education
and on keeping state and federal governments as far removed as possible from
schoolbook decisions. More broadly, the accommodation of autonomy and
cultural transmission, individuality and community, negative liberty and
positive liberty, ultimately requires dedication to traditional liberal values of
civility and tolerance.
200. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 280 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
201. See generally M.G. YuDoF, supra note 34, ch. 7.
202. A. MAclINrRa, AsrR VmrTuE 207 (1981).
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But the education of the young can never fully escape from the Archimedean
dilemma, even if it is informed by a spirit of toleration. Perhaps it is true,
as Umberto Eco admonished the villian in The Name of the Rose, a book
about a medieval library, "the Devil is the arrogance of the spirit, faith without
smile, truth that is never seized by doubt. ' 2 0 1 Education, however, confronts
more than one devil. Without accepted truths and conventions, a society risks
ignorance: "[W]hen I saw that [Cicero] . . . doubted everything, I concluded
I knew as much as he and did not need anybody in order to be ignorant. '2 14
203. U. Eco, THE NA m oF THE RosE 477 (1983).
204. FiAiqois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Candide 94 (N. Torrey ed. 1946).
